Thoughts in the wake of essentialist/ anti-essentialist debate
1. I cannot agree with any essentialist narrative of identity. Firstly, there is an issue of construction. Such narratives remind me of the Colonial governmentality, of the enormous activities of knowledge production known as Indology (or Colonial Indology according to taste). It reminds me of a particular brand of history which has been naturalized. Reiteration of such narrative to me is tantamount to a reification of colonialist history. I keep on pointing to this colonial context fully knowing that this is not fashionable these days!
Secondly, hearing such narratives, I wonder what purposes are being served. Is not this almost similar to the separatist discourse we keep on hearing from all the different primordialist groups in South Asia and other places of the world? We are ‘originally’ from or we want to perform some original form of law or this land (…) is the land of the Hindus and as a support to this claim demolishing a mosque, all these are reiteration of the same discourse of separatism, which is best understood if we take into consideration the concept of modernity in this part of the world. The main feature of this separatist discourse, which is modern, is to claim origin to a land or territory. From this emerged what is often termed as “religious nationalism” in India where claim is made that “members of different religion are [thereby] members of different nations and..{p 2)
Events at the Balkans, or the gruesome Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Africa and some other long standing ‘ethnic’ and ‘tribal’ conflicts have made me critical of any essentialist reading of identity, be it in Europe or in South Asia. What is missed often in this discursive construction or in these readings is the very role played out by ‘modernity’. Some scholars in India have pointed out that such assertions are essentially modern, and bourgeoisie and are often in the hands of the elite. If we just look around ‘us’ we will start gathering more such evidences.
In such a circumstance, Hayden in a comparative discussion of the Balkans and South Asia, points out that the critical task of the scholar is to “find ways to argue against the use of the past for racist, sexist and other oppressive purposes” by emphasizing “the fluidity and changeability of all groups and identities” (Bernbeck and Pollack 1996; cited in Hayden 2002). I think this is very well thought out under the circumstances we live in today in South Asia, Europe and elsewhere. It is precisely this aspect of critically looking at the historical details that has made me interested in the recent interview by I A Rehman, a renowned Pakistani journalist. I have endeavored to translate the selected sections and will later raise some issues:
Prothom alo: The constitution of Pakistan does accept Shari law. Then, what exactly is being demanded by the Taleban of the Swat region of the northwestern frontier?
I A Rehman: But they say ‘Sharia law’. They only say Sharia. The Sharia law of our constitution is not acceptable to them. And now you talk about model. They themselves don’t know what kind of Sharia they want to apply. Because, there is no written version of their Sharia. We know of four types of Sharia law. The one which existed in the 13th century was adopted by Ziaul Haq. What we have in the Pakistani constitution is precisely this. Now the Sawat Talebans are saying that they do not accept whatever Sharia law is now found written. We will draw upon a Sharia whose ultimate explanation will be provided by us. But the question is, who is going to be the judge? Who will appoint them? Where will appeal take place? Within the Pakistan constitution there is scope in the Pakistan supreme-court for Shariat appeal bench. But the Swat Talebans are saying, there should not be scope for appeal against their court verdict.
Prothom alo: Oh! Does this also apply for death sentence?
I A Rehman: Definitely. They are executing death sentence the moment sentence is proclaimed. And they are appointing qazis in these courts all by themselves according to their wish. A lot of people at Swat at the beginning thought that they would be allowed to appeal in these courts like before in the Supreme Court. This misconception is now gone.
Prothom alo: How is it possible for the Zardari government to sign this deal? This does not fit with the constitution.
I A Rehman: They thought that it was constitutional. There is a history in Swat region. There was no court. British were ruling using a nineteenth century law. Frontier Crimes Regulation. Then there was zirga or courts run by the elderly. So when the Talebans were talking about Sharia law, the government thought they were perhaps trying to revive the previous zirga system. There was scope for appeal in that system. But now the Talebani leader of Swat Sufi Mohammed is saying, ‘No’. This cannot take place. Not only that. Before even the execution of the deal, they are now saying that they don’t accept the constitution and parliament. So, the question of accepting the court system does not arise. Courts are run within the constitution.
[Excerpted version of a special interview of IA Rehman (1930-) published in the Daily Prothom Alo on 5th May 09 in Bangla. Interviewed by Mizanur Rahman Khan; the brief introduction notes that Mr Rehman was born in Pnajab. He had lost a number of family members during the partition year and migrated to Pakistan with his father. All translations are mine]
2. Scholars observing and working on the various ‘Islamist’ movements in Bangladesh have tried to do this precisely in their work. For example in the piece titled “Our inheritances” Rahnuma Ahmed discussed the colonialist context of the Muslim family law. Drawing on Talal Asad’s work, she pointed out that
“Before British rule, ..most Muslims and non-Muslims led largely similar lives. Muslim law was applied only in the urban centres, not in rural communities. This was not due to a lack of knowledge, but because social organisation, the nature of property rights and forms of livelihood, was the same for Hindus and Muslims. Being a Muslim meant following Muslim rites of marriage and burial, maybe having a Muslim name. Nothing more.”
State intervention, she points out, in village life, “was largely centered around the assessment and collection of land revenue, or military recruitment”. Following Michael Anderson, she further notes that the need for colonial rule to obtain “simple, reliable and reasonable accurate understanding of native social life” has forced the colonial government to find a solution in law, and legal texts. And this implied mobilization of institutions and technologies of colonial governance (i.e. law officers, textbooks, codifications, and other legal technologies). This also implied mistakes, writes Ahmed, the most celebrated being that “the treatment of classical Islamic texts (the Quran) as binding legal codes”. Summarizing Anderson’s work, Ahmed puts away these words for the readers:
“This was in contrast to the pre-British period, where legal texts were never directly applied. Instead, a qazi, someone who had proper authority, was morally sound and knowledgeable of local arrangements, would translate legal precepts into practice.”
Ahmed here notes that Anderson does argue that colonial judicial administration gradually became more sophisticated, nevertheless, he does not miss the point that a basic prejudice remained. “Texts were considered more important than interpretive practices” she adds.
Although not made explicit, I here would add that Ahmed’s effort at historicizing the holy scripture of Islam in the Indian subcontinent is driven perhaps by a scholarly effort to sweep whatever essentialist/ primordialist claims are being made by the ‘Muslim clerics’ and ‘Islamic parties’ in Bangladesh. Perhaps this is what is implied in the author’s title of the piece ‘Our inheritances’, which to me is deeply suggestive and points to the role played out by colonialism in shaping up the discourse and how this remains alive in the ‘imperial-present’.
3. The reason I quote Ahmed at length is because of her reference to the pre-colonial qazi system. She aptly notes using other sources (which I do not elaborate here) that it was the qazi with proper authority and moral soundness and knowledge not the direct application of legal texts which was the practice of the pre-Britsh period. The interview on the other hand also refers to a similar situation where the current leaders of Sawat Talebans are also trying to revive the qazi system, but as the journalist Rehman notes, they are not interested in the system that has been subsequently adopted in the Pakistan constitution. What is intriguing however in this interview is Mr Rehman’s remark that the Sawat Talebans are now saying that they do not want to accept whatever Sharia law is now found written. It is on the pretext of this emphasis I ask, is this a movement against textuality? What can one read off this?
Bibliography
AHMED, RAHNUMA, Our inheritances; http://www.newagebd.com/2008/apr/28/edit.html
HAYDEN, ROBERT M. 2002. Antagonistic Tolerance. Competitive Sharing of Religious Site in South Asia and the Balkans. Current Anthropology. Volume 43: 2.
Secondly, hearing such narratives, I wonder what purposes are being served. Is not this almost similar to the separatist discourse we keep on hearing from all the different primordialist groups in South Asia and other places of the world? We are ‘originally’ from or we want to perform some original form of law or this land (…) is the land of the Hindus and as a support to this claim demolishing a mosque, all these are reiteration of the same discourse of separatism, which is best understood if we take into consideration the concept of modernity in this part of the world. The main feature of this separatist discourse, which is modern, is to claim origin to a land or territory. From this emerged what is often termed as “religious nationalism” in India where claim is made that “members of different religion are [thereby] members of different nations and..{p 2)
Events at the Balkans, or the gruesome Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Africa and some other long standing ‘ethnic’ and ‘tribal’ conflicts have made me critical of any essentialist reading of identity, be it in Europe or in South Asia. What is missed often in this discursive construction or in these readings is the very role played out by ‘modernity’. Some scholars in India have pointed out that such assertions are essentially modern, and bourgeoisie and are often in the hands of the elite. If we just look around ‘us’ we will start gathering more such evidences.
In such a circumstance, Hayden in a comparative discussion of the Balkans and South Asia, points out that the critical task of the scholar is to “find ways to argue against the use of the past for racist, sexist and other oppressive purposes” by emphasizing “the fluidity and changeability of all groups and identities” (Bernbeck and Pollack 1996; cited in Hayden 2002). I think this is very well thought out under the circumstances we live in today in South Asia, Europe and elsewhere. It is precisely this aspect of critically looking at the historical details that has made me interested in the recent interview by I A Rehman, a renowned Pakistani journalist. I have endeavored to translate the selected sections and will later raise some issues:
Prothom alo: The constitution of Pakistan does accept Shari law. Then, what exactly is being demanded by the Taleban of the Swat region of the northwestern frontier?
I A Rehman: But they say ‘Sharia law’. They only say Sharia. The Sharia law of our constitution is not acceptable to them. And now you talk about model. They themselves don’t know what kind of Sharia they want to apply. Because, there is no written version of their Sharia. We know of four types of Sharia law. The one which existed in the 13th century was adopted by Ziaul Haq. What we have in the Pakistani constitution is precisely this. Now the Sawat Talebans are saying that they do not accept whatever Sharia law is now found written. We will draw upon a Sharia whose ultimate explanation will be provided by us. But the question is, who is going to be the judge? Who will appoint them? Where will appeal take place? Within the Pakistan constitution there is scope in the Pakistan supreme-court for Shariat appeal bench. But the Swat Talebans are saying, there should not be scope for appeal against their court verdict.
Prothom alo: Oh! Does this also apply for death sentence?
I A Rehman: Definitely. They are executing death sentence the moment sentence is proclaimed. And they are appointing qazis in these courts all by themselves according to their wish. A lot of people at Swat at the beginning thought that they would be allowed to appeal in these courts like before in the Supreme Court. This misconception is now gone.
Prothom alo: How is it possible for the Zardari government to sign this deal? This does not fit with the constitution.
I A Rehman: They thought that it was constitutional. There is a history in Swat region. There was no court. British were ruling using a nineteenth century law. Frontier Crimes Regulation. Then there was zirga or courts run by the elderly. So when the Talebans were talking about Sharia law, the government thought they were perhaps trying to revive the previous zirga system. There was scope for appeal in that system. But now the Talebani leader of Swat Sufi Mohammed is saying, ‘No’. This cannot take place. Not only that. Before even the execution of the deal, they are now saying that they don’t accept the constitution and parliament. So, the question of accepting the court system does not arise. Courts are run within the constitution.
[Excerpted version of a special interview of IA Rehman (1930-) published in the Daily Prothom Alo on 5th May 09 in Bangla. Interviewed by Mizanur Rahman Khan; the brief introduction notes that Mr Rehman was born in Pnajab. He had lost a number of family members during the partition year and migrated to Pakistan with his father. All translations are mine]
2. Scholars observing and working on the various ‘Islamist’ movements in Bangladesh have tried to do this precisely in their work. For example in the piece titled “Our inheritances” Rahnuma Ahmed discussed the colonialist context of the Muslim family law. Drawing on Talal Asad’s work, she pointed out that
“Before British rule, ..most Muslims and non-Muslims led largely similar lives. Muslim law was applied only in the urban centres, not in rural communities. This was not due to a lack of knowledge, but because social organisation, the nature of property rights and forms of livelihood, was the same for Hindus and Muslims. Being a Muslim meant following Muslim rites of marriage and burial, maybe having a Muslim name. Nothing more.”
State intervention, she points out, in village life, “was largely centered around the assessment and collection of land revenue, or military recruitment”. Following Michael Anderson, she further notes that the need for colonial rule to obtain “simple, reliable and reasonable accurate understanding of native social life” has forced the colonial government to find a solution in law, and legal texts. And this implied mobilization of institutions and technologies of colonial governance (i.e. law officers, textbooks, codifications, and other legal technologies). This also implied mistakes, writes Ahmed, the most celebrated being that “the treatment of classical Islamic texts (the Quran) as binding legal codes”. Summarizing Anderson’s work, Ahmed puts away these words for the readers:
“This was in contrast to the pre-British period, where legal texts were never directly applied. Instead, a qazi, someone who had proper authority, was morally sound and knowledgeable of local arrangements, would translate legal precepts into practice.”
Ahmed here notes that Anderson does argue that colonial judicial administration gradually became more sophisticated, nevertheless, he does not miss the point that a basic prejudice remained. “Texts were considered more important than interpretive practices” she adds.
Although not made explicit, I here would add that Ahmed’s effort at historicizing the holy scripture of Islam in the Indian subcontinent is driven perhaps by a scholarly effort to sweep whatever essentialist/ primordialist claims are being made by the ‘Muslim clerics’ and ‘Islamic parties’ in Bangladesh. Perhaps this is what is implied in the author’s title of the piece ‘Our inheritances’, which to me is deeply suggestive and points to the role played out by colonialism in shaping up the discourse and how this remains alive in the ‘imperial-present’.
3. The reason I quote Ahmed at length is because of her reference to the pre-colonial qazi system. She aptly notes using other sources (which I do not elaborate here) that it was the qazi with proper authority and moral soundness and knowledge not the direct application of legal texts which was the practice of the pre-Britsh period. The interview on the other hand also refers to a similar situation where the current leaders of Sawat Talebans are also trying to revive the qazi system, but as the journalist Rehman notes, they are not interested in the system that has been subsequently adopted in the Pakistan constitution. What is intriguing however in this interview is Mr Rehman’s remark that the Sawat Talebans are now saying that they do not want to accept whatever Sharia law is now found written. It is on the pretext of this emphasis I ask, is this a movement against textuality? What can one read off this?
Bibliography
AHMED, RAHNUMA, Our inheritances; http://www.newagebd.com/2008/apr/28/edit.html
HAYDEN, ROBERT M. 2002. Antagonistic Tolerance. Competitive Sharing of Religious Site in South Asia and the Balkans. Current Anthropology. Volume 43: 2.
Comments